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We show that feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m
alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property: no coalition can 
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1. Introduction
This paper focuses on the question of how to choose a set of k alternatives from a set of m > k alternatives, by aggregat-
ing the preferences of voters over alternatives in a way that cannot be manipulated in the following sense: no coalition of 
voters, by possibly misrepresenting their preferences, can guarantee an outcome that all members of the coalition prefer to 
the outcome obtained by sincere, truthful voting. For instance, the set of k alternatives is a department board, which has to 
be composed from a set of available candidates, and we are looking for a voting method such that no coalition of voters, by 
not voting sincerely, can guarantee a board that all members of the coalition prefer. In order to achieve this, we will use an 
extension of a method that was originally proposed by Peleg (1978) as a reaction to the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem.
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard, 1973, and Satterthwaite, 1975) states that every non-dictatorial social 
choice function whose range contains at least three alternatives, is manipulable: there exists a proﬁle of preferences and a 
voter who, by deviating and reporting a preference different from his true one, can obtain an outcome which he prefers, 
according to his true preference, to the sincere outcome. From a game-theoretic point of view, a social choice function 
combined with a (true) preference proﬁle is a game in strategic form, the strategy set of each player being the set of 
preferences over the alternatives; outcomes of the game are evaluated according to the true preferences. Peleg (1978)
showed that there are reasonable (anonymous, Maskin monotonic) social choice functions such that the resulting game has 
a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome whatever the true preferences. Social choice functions with this 
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is in the core of the relevant voting game: this means that there is no coalition of voters that has a strategy proﬁle which 
guarantees an alternative that all members of the coalition prefer over the sincere outcome. Of course, the sincere outcome 
may not be the unique outcome of a strong Nash equilibrium.1
The central tool, introduced in Peleg (1978), to obtain these social choice functions is the concept of a feasible elimination 
procedure. In such a procedure, applied to a proﬁle of preferences, alternatives are eliminated one by one, until a ﬁnal 
alternative remains: this is called a maximal alternative. In this paper we use this procedure to select k > 1 alternatives, 
simply by taking the last k instead of only the last alternative. We show that for at least two extensions of voters’ preferences 
over the alternatives to (ordered) k-tuples of alternatives, this method has the core property: no coalition can guarantee 
an outcome (k-tuple) that is preferred by all its members. Formally, this core is deﬁned as the core of the effectivity 
function induced by this method. We show, by an example, that some well-known existing methods (single transferable 
vote, plurality, plurality with run-off) violate the core property.
We also show that the problem of determining whether a speciﬁc k-tuple can result from a feasible elimination proce-
dure is computationally equivalent to the problem of ﬁnding a maximal matching in a bipartite graph. The latter problem 
can be solved in polynomial time (Hopcroft and Karp, 1973).
Section 2 introduces feasible elimination procedures and Section 3 shows that these procedures provide a method to 
choose k alternatives from a set of m alternatives such that no coalition of voters can guarantee a better result by manip-
ulation. We also show that this method is Maskin monotonic. Section 4 considers the computational aspect, and Section 5
concludes.
Notations. The following basic notations are used throughout. For a set D , |D| denotes the cardinality of D , P (D) the power 
set, i.e., the set of all subsets of D , and P0(D) the set of all nonempty subsets of D .
2. Preliminaries
Let A be a set of m alternatives, m ≥ 2, and let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, be a set of voters. Denote by L the set of all linear 
orderings, i.e., complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relations, of A. An element of L is also called a preference, and 
an element of LN a preference proﬁle. If xRi y for some x, y ∈ A and i ∈ N , where Ri ∈ L, then this is interpreted as voter i
strictly preferring x over y.
A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a function H : LN → P0(A). An SCC H is anonymous if for all RN ∈ LN and for all 
permutations π of N , H(R1, . . . , Rn) = H(Rπ(1), . . . , Rπ(n)). It is Paretian if for all x, y ∈ A and RN ∈ LN , if x = y and yRix
for all i ∈ N , then x /∈ H(RN). It is Maskin monotonic (Maskin, 1999) if it satisﬁes the following. Let RN , Q N ∈ LN and let 
x ∈ H(Q N ). If xQ i y implies xRi y for all y ∈ A and i ∈ N , then x ∈ H(RN).
In this paper we are especially interested in the SCC derived from feasible elimination procedures, introduced by Peleg
(1978).
Deﬁnition 2.1. Assume that n + 1 ≥m and let β : A → {1, 2 . . .} satisfy ∑x∈A β(x) = n + 1. Let RN ∈ LN . A feasible elimination 
procedure (f.e.p.) for RN is a sequence (x1, C1; . . . ; xm−1, Cm−1; xm) such that
1) A = {x1, . . . , xm},
2) C1, . . . , Cm−1 are pairwise disjoint subsets of N and |C j | = β(x j) for j = 1, . . . , m − 1,
3) For all j = 1, . . . , m − 1, xkRix j for all k = j + 1, . . . , m and i ∈ C j .
Thus, in a feasible elimination procedure, we can consecutively eliminate bottom alternatives x1, x2, . . . , xm−1 of the 
preference proﬁle; when we eliminate an alternative x j we also eliminate the preferences of β(x j) voters who have x j
at bottom in the current proﬁle. From the assumptions in the deﬁnition it easily follows that there exists always at 
least one f.e.p. Henceforth in this paper we assume n + 1 ≥ m. An alternative y is RN -maximal if there exists an f.e.p. 
(x1, C1; . . . ; xm−1, Cm−1; y). We denote
M(RN) = {x ∈ A : x is RN-maximal}.
It is not diﬃcult to see that M is an anonymous and Paretian social choice correspondence.2 Also, M is Maskin monotonic. 
This follows from Lemma 3.7 below.
1 Peleg (1978) has been followed by several investigations of the set of exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions: Dutta and Pattanaik (1978), 
Polishchuk (1978), Ishikawa and Nakamura (1980), Oren (1981), Kim and Roush (1981), Holzman (1986), and Peleg and Peters (2006). Also the books of 
Peleg (1984), Abdou and Keiding (1991), Danilov and Sotskov (2002), and Peleg and Peters (2010) contain lengthy analytic discussions of consistent voting 
systems.
2 Clearly, M depends on β , but this is suppressed from notation if no confusion is likely.
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that, for every social choice function F (i.e., single-valued SCC) that is a selection from M , the game in which each voter 
reports a preference and the outcome is determined by F , has a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome, 
i.e., the alternative resulting if the players would report truthfully. This provides a way to obtain the sincere outcome in spite 
of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite result that any reasonable social choice function is manipulable. In fact, it can be shown that 
under anonymity and a very reasonable additional condition, namely that no single voter can veto an alternative, selecting 
from maximal alternatives is the only way to achieve this (see Peleg and Peters, 2010).
3. Choosing k from m
In this section we show how the concept of a feasible elimination procedure can be used to select not just one al-
ternative, but an ordered k-tuple of alternatives, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1. We show, in particular, that the resulting method 
has the ‘core property’: there is no subset of voters that can vote strategically in order to guarantee a better outcome for 
all its members. This is in contrast to some well-known existing methods that can be used for choosing k from m – see 
Example 3.6.
In order to formalize this we use the concept of an effectivity function, deﬁned here for some general ﬁnite set of 
alternatives Z .
Deﬁnition 3.1. A function E : P (N) → P (P0(Z)) is an effectivity function (EF) if: 1) E(N) = P0(Z), 2) Z ∈ E(S) for every 
S ∈ P0(N), and 3) E(∅) = ∅.
If B ∈ E(S) for an effectivity function E , then we say that coalition S is effective for the set of alternatives B . The 
interpretation is that S can ‘guarantee’ that the ‘ﬁnal’ alternative is in B .
Let k ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} and denote by A¯k the set
{(x1, . . . , xk) ∈ Ak : |{x1, . . . , xk}| = k}.
As before, assume that n + 1 ≥ m and let β : A → N satisfy ∑x∈A β(x) = n + 1. For these weights, we deﬁne Mk : LN →
P0( A¯k) by: (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Mk(RN ) if there is an f.e.p. (x1, C1; . . . ; xm−1, Cm−1; xm) such that (y1, . . . , yk) = (xm−k+1, . . . , xm). 
In words, Mk assigns to a preference proﬁle all tuples of k last alternatives in any f.e.p. for that proﬁle. Clearly, M1 = M . 
Deﬁne the function EM
k : P (N) → P (P0( A¯k)) by EMk (∅) = ∅ and, for S = ∅ and Bk ⊆ A¯k:
Bk ∈ EMk (S) :⇔ ∃RS ∈ LS [∀RN\S ∈ LN\S : Mk(RS , RN\S) ⊆ Bk].
Since, in particular, {(x1, . . . , xk)} ∈ EMk (N) for each (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A¯k (namely, for each i ∈ N let Ri satisfy xkRixk−1 . . .
x2Rix1Ri . . .), we have that EM
k
is an effectivity function, with Z = A¯k in Deﬁnition 3.1.
In this paper we consider two kinds of preferences of the voters for k-tuples. Both kinds of preferences extend the origi-
nal preferences in L to linear orderings on A¯k . In the ﬁrst extension we respect the order of a k-tuple and lexicographically 
compare alternatives, starting from the rightmost one. Formally we have:
(P1) Let R ∈ L. Then for x¯ = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A¯k and y¯ = (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ A¯k we deﬁne x¯R¯ y¯ if xR y , where  = max{ j ∈
{1, . . . , k} : x j = y j}.
In the second extension we ignore the order of a k-tuple and lexicographically compare alternatives, starting from the worst 
one. Formally we have:
(P2) Let R ∈ L. For x¯ = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A¯k and y¯ = (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ A¯k reorder the alternatives so that xi1 R . . . Rxik and 
y j1 R . . . Ry jk . Then we deﬁne x¯R¯ y¯ if xi R y j , where  =max{h ∈ {1, . . . , k} : xih = y jh }.
Preference extension P1 could apply, for instance, if a president and a vice-president of a society have to be chosen 
(k = 2). Then we ﬁrst compare the candidates for president and, in case these are equal, we compare the candidates for 
vice-president. Extension P2 could apply when the members of a board to be chosen are on equal foot. Then we ﬁrst 
compare the worst candidates. If these are the same, then we compare second worst candidates, etc.
In what follows we concentrate on these two preference extensions. For another extension and discussion, see Section 5. 
Before we can formulate the main results of this section we need another deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let E : P (N) → P (P0(Z)) be an EF, let RN be a proﬁle of linear orderings over Z , let S ∈ P0(N), let B ∈ E(S), 
and let z ∈ Z \ B . We say that z is dominated by B via S at RN if z′Ri z for all z′ ∈ B and i ∈ S; z is dominated at RN if there 
exist B and S as above such that B dominates z via S at RN . The core of E at RN , C(E, RN), is the set of all alternatives that 
are not dominated at RN .
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the latter.
Theorem 3.3. Let RN ∈ LN , and let R¯N be the proﬁle of extended preferences according to (P2). Then Mk(RN) ⊆ C(EMk , R¯N ).
Proof. Consider an f.e.p. f ∗ = (x1, C1; . . . ; xm−1, Cm−1; xm) for RN , resulting in (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(RN ). Suppose there is 
an S ⊆ N and a set Bk ⊆ A¯k such that Bk ∈ EMk (S), (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) /∈ Bk , and y¯ R¯ i(xm−k+1, . . . , xm) for all i ∈ S and y¯ ∈ Bk . 
We derive a contradiction, which completes the proof of the theorem.
Let K = {xm−k+1, . . . , xm} and let
B = {x ∈ A : x ∈ {y1, . . . , yk} for some (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Bk}.
Note that B \ K = ∅, otherwise we would have B = K , which is not possible in view of the preferences of the voters in S . 
Consider any x j ∈ B \ K , and y¯ = (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Bk with y = x j for some  ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Since y¯ R¯ i(xm−k+1, . . . , xm) for all 
i ∈ S , by (P2) there is for each i ∈ S an xh ∈ K with x j Rixh . Since x j is eliminated according to f ∗ prior to the alternatives 
of K , this implies that C j ∩ S = ∅. Hence, the alternatives of B \ K are eliminated according to f ∗ via only voters in N \ S . 
Therefore we have |N \ S| ≥ β(B \ K ).
Let Q S ∈ LS be a proﬁle resulting in Bk , i.e., Mk(Q S , V N\S ) ⊆ Bk for all V N\S ∈ LN\S . Consider, in particular, a proﬁle 
V N\S ∈ LN\S such that each x j ∈ B \ K is a bottom alternative for at least β(x j) voters in N \ S (this is possible since |N \ S| ≥
β(B \ K )). Then, for this speciﬁc proﬁle (Q S , V N\S ), there is an f.e.p. in which all alternatives of B \ K are eliminated ﬁrst. 
This implies that the resulting k-tuple, say y¯, of Bk can only contain alternatives of K , contradicting y¯ R¯ i(xm−k+1, . . . , xm)
for all i ∈ S . 
Theorem 3.4. Let RN ∈ LN , and let R¯N be the proﬁle of extended preferences according to (P1). Then Mk(RN) ⊆ C(EMk , R¯N ).
Proof. Let f ∗ , S , Bk , and Q S be as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. The proof proceeds in several steps.
Step 1 Let
B(m) = {x j ∈ A : j ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} and
x j = yk for some (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Bk}.
By (P1), we have x j Rixm for all x j ∈ B(m) and i ∈ S . Hence, C j ⊆ N \ S for all j with x j ∈ B(m), so that |N \ S| ≥ β(B(m)). 
Consider a proﬁle V N\S(m) ∈ LN\S where all x j ∈ B(m) are ranked at bottom positions for at least β(x j) voters in N \ S . Let 
Bk(m) be the subset of Bk , consisting of all k-tuples which are obtained by f.e.p.’s for the proﬁle (Q S , V N\S (m)) such that 
the alternatives of B(m) are eliminated ﬁrst, with x j before x whenever x j, x ∈ B(m) and j < ; clearly, all these f.e.p.’s 
result in xm , so that yk = xm for all (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Bk(m).
Step 2 Let
B(m − 1) = {x j : j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 2} and
x j = yk−1 for some (y1, . . . , yk−1, xm) ∈ Bk(m)}.
By (P1), we have x j Rixm−1 for all x j ∈ B(m − 1) and i ∈ S . Hence, C j ⊆ N \ S for all j with x j ∈ B(m − 1), so that |N \ S| ≥
β(B(m) ∪ B(m − 1)). Consider a proﬁle V N\S(m − 1) ∈ LN\S where all x j ∈ B(m) ∪ B(m − 1) are ranked at bottom positions 
for at least β(x j) voters in N \ S . Let Bk(m − 1) be the subset of Bk(m), consisting of all k-tuples which are obtained by 
f.e.p.’s for the proﬁle (Q S , V N\S (m − 1)) such that the alternatives of B(m) ∪ B(m − 1) are eliminated ﬁrst, with x j before 
x whenever x j, x ∈ B(m) ∪ B(m − 1) and j < ; clearly, all these f.e.p.’s have (xm−1, xm) as last pair, so that yk−1 = xm−1
and yk = xm for all (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Bk(m − 1).
.
.
.
Step k Let
B(m − k + 1) = {x j : j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− k} and
x j = y1 for some (y1, xm−k+2, . . . , xm) ∈ Bk(m − k + 2)}.
By (P1), we have x j Rixm−k+1 for all x j ∈ B(m − k + 1) and i ∈ S . Hence, C j ⊆ N \ S for all j with x j ∈ B(m − k + 1), so that 
|N \ S| ≥ β(B(m) ∪ . . .∪ B(m −k +1)). Consider a proﬁle V N\S (m −k +1) ∈ LN\S where all x j ∈ B(m) ∪ . . .∪ B(m −k +1) are 
ranked at bottom positions for at least β(x j) voters in N \ S . Let Bk(m − k + 1) be the subset of Bk(m − k + 2), consisting 
of all k-tuples which are obtained by f.e.p.’s for the proﬁle (Q S , V N\S (m − k + 1)) such that the alternatives of B(m) ∪ . . . ∪
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f.e.p.’s have (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) as last k-tuple. This, however, implies that (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Bk , which is a contradiction. 
The following example shows that the set inclusions in Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 can be strict if k > 1. (For k = 1 we do 
have M(RN) = C(EM , RN) for all RN ∈ LN by Lemma 9.3.2 and Theorem 9.3.6 in Peleg and Peters, 2010.)
Example 3.5. Let A = {x, y, z}, N = {1, . . . , 4}, β(x) = 1, and β(y) = β(z) = 2. Consider the proﬁle RN given in the following 
table:
R1 R2 R3 R4
y y x x
z z z y
x x y z
Then M2(RN ) = {(z, y)}. We claim that the pair (x, y) is in C(EM2 , R¯N ) according to preference assumption (P2). First, (x, y)
is top-ranked for voter 4. Voter 3 only prefers (x, z) or (z, x) to (x, y) but this is not the case for voters 1 and 2. However, 
voter 3 alone is not effective for {(x, z), (z, x)}. Finally, voters 1 and 2 only prefer (y, z) and (z, y) to (x, y), but {1, 2} is not 
effective for {(y, z), (z, y)}. We conclude that (x, y) is in C(EM2 , R¯N) under assumption (P2).
Now consider preference assumption (P1). We claim that (x, y) is still in C(EM
2
, R¯N). Voter 4 ﬁnds (z, x) and (y, x)
better than (x, y); also voter 3 ﬁnds (z, x) and (y, x) better than (x, y), but voters 1 and 2 prefer (x, y) over (z, x) and 
(y, x), and {3, 4} is not effective for {(z, x), (y, x)}: e.g., {1, 2} can put x at bottom so that x can be eliminated ﬁrst. Voter 3 
prefers every alternative in the set {(y, x), (z, x), (y, z), (x, z)} to (x, y), but 1 and 2 prefer only (z, y) over (x, y), and {3}
is not effective for {(y, x), (z, x), (y, z), (x, z)}: {1, 2, 4} can put x and z at bottom so that y ends up last. Finally, {1, 2} is 
not effective for {(z, y)}: e.g., {3, 4} can put z at bottom so that z can be eliminated ﬁrst. We conclude that (x, y) is in 
C(EM
2
, R¯N) also under assumption (P1).
The fact that Mk satisﬁes the core property as in Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 means that there is never a coalition of voters 
which can guarantee an outcome (k-tuple) that is better for all its members in case Mk is used, i.e., if a feasible elimination 
procedure is used. This fact is certainly not shared by well-known existing methods. The following example illustrates this.
Example 3.6. Let A = {a, b, c, d}, N = {1, 2, 3}, and β(x) = 1 for all x ∈ A. Consider the proﬁle RN given in the following table:
R1 R2 R3
a b c
b c a
c a b
d d d
Suppose we have to select two candidates. In this case, M2 is quite inconclusive: M2(RN) = {(x, y) ∈ A¯2 : x = d, y = d}. Still, 
by Theorems 3.3 and 3.4, no coalition of voters can improve on any of the pairs in M2(RN). Now consider the method 
of single transferable vote (STV – see for instance Brams and Fishburn, 2002). According to STV, ﬁrst d is eliminated, but 
thereafter either a or b or c is eliminated. For instance, if a is eliminated, then next b is chosen and ﬁnally c, so that in our 
notation the pair (c, b) results. This way, we obtain STV(RN) = {(c, b), (b, a), (a, c)}. Now take, for instance, the pair (b, a). 
Both voters 2 and 3 prefer the pair (b, c) over (b, a) – under both (P1) and (P2) – and, moreover, under STV the coalition 
{2, 3} is effective for {(b, c)} by the strategy proﬁle
Q 2 Q 3
c c
b b
a a
d d
In fact, under STV the core for the proﬁle in this example (which is a slightly modiﬁed version of the Condorcet paradox) is 
empty. It is easy to see that the same example applies to methods like plurality voting or run-off elections, assuming that 
in case of ties we can choose arbitrarily between tied alternatives, as in STV or feasible elimination procedures.
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is also of independent interest. A function H : LN → P0( A¯k) is Maskin monotonic if it satisﬁes the following. Let RN , Q N ∈ LN
and let (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ H(Q N). If x j Q i y implies x j Ri y for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, y ∈ A and i ∈ N , then (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ H(RN). For 
k = 1, this deﬁnition coincides with the deﬁnition of Maskin monotonicity in Section 2.3
Lemma 3.7. Mk is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. Let Q N and RN as in the deﬁnition of Maskin monotonicity. Without loss of generality we assume that there is a 
voter v such that Q N\{v} = RN\{v} . Let f ∗ = (x1, C1; . . . ; xm−1, Cm−1; xm) be an f.e.p. for Q N . If v /∈ C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cm−k then it 
is easy to see that f ∗ is still an f.e.p. for RN , so that (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(RN). Now assume v ∈ C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cm−k . If v ∈ C j
with j > 1, then we may eliminate x1, . . . , x j−1 and all voters in C1 ∪ . . . ∪ C j−1 ﬁrst, and next continue the argument with 
the remaining proﬁle, where now all voters in C j have x j bottom ranked according to Q . So, without loss of generality, let 
v ∈ C1.
The rest of the proof is based on a three step algorithm.
Step 1 If the bottom alternative of Rv is equal to x1, then f ∗ is still an f.e.p. for RN and we are done. Otherwise, go to 
Step 2.
Step 2 Let the bottom alternative of Rv be x = x1, so  ∈ {2, . . . , m − k}. If all voters in C have x as bottom alternative 
in RN , then we can ﬁrst eliminate x via C and go back to Step 1 for the reduced proﬁle. Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 3 Take vˆ ∈ C with x not as bottom alternative and note that the bottom alternative of R vˆ = Q vˆ is some x j
with j <  (since x j must be eliminated before x in f ∗). Then modify C to Cˆ = (C ∪ {v}) \ {vˆ} and modify C1 to 
Cˆ1 = (C1 ∪ {vˆ}) \ {v}. (In words, we switch v and vˆ .) Go back to Step 1.
Repeat this procedure until the ﬁnal substitute of v in the modiﬁed C1 has x1 at bottom. Then we can apply an f.e.p. 
resulting in (xm−k+1, . . . , xm), so that (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(RN ). 
For k = 1, Maskin monotonicity was already proved in Peleg (1984), Lemma 5.3.5.
4. A method for computing Mk in polynomial time
In this section we show that the SCC Mk can be computed in polynomial time. The argument will be based on the 
following lemma, which, in turn, follows from Maskin monotonicity of Mk . Throughout, Mk is assumed to be deﬁned with 
respect to weights β(x), x ∈ A.
Lemma 4.1. Let RN ∈ LN . Then (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(RN ) if and only if there exist pairwise disjoint subsets S(y), y ∈ A \ {xm}, of 
N such that
(1) x j Rix for all  =m − k + 1, . . . , m − 1, j > , and i ∈ S(x),
(2) x j Ri y for all y ∈ A \ {xm−k+1, . . . , xm}, j =m − k + 1, . . . , m, and i ∈ S(y),
(3) |S(y)| = β(y) for all y ∈ A \ {xm}.
Proof. The only-if direction follows immediately from the deﬁnition of an f.e.p. For the if-direction, let (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ A¯k
and assume that there exist subsets S(y) of N , satisfying (1), (2), and (3). List the alternatives of A \ {xm−k+1, . . . , xm} as 
{x1, . . . , xm−k}. Consider the following proﬁle Q N ∈ LN . For j = 1, . . . , m −k and i ∈ S(x j) shift x j to the bottom of Ri , leaving 
everything else intact. For all other voters i, let Q i = Ri . Then (x1, S(x1); . . . ; xm−1, S(xm−1); xm) is an f.e.p. for Q N , so that 
(xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(Q N ). By Maskin monotonicity of Mk (see Lemma 3.7), (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(RN ). 
Lemma 4.1 can be used to determine if an alternative (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) of A¯k , is in Mk(RN ). We ﬁrst collect a few 
graph-theoretical concepts in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.2. A bipartite graph is a triple (X, Y , W ), where X and Y are ﬁnite disjoint sets and W ⊆ X × Y . Here, the 
elements of X and Y are called vertices and the elements of W edges. A matching is a set V ⊆ W such that for all 
(x, y), (x, y′), (x′, y) ∈ V we have y = y′ and x = x′ . A matching V is maximal if there is no matching V ′ that has more 
edges, i.e., there is no matching V ′ with |V ′| > |V |.
For (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ A¯k we deﬁne a bipartite graph (X, Y , W ) as follows. Let X = N and Y = {x1, . . . , xβ(x) :  =
1, . . . , m − 1}, where the alternatives in A \ {xm−k+1, . . . , xm} are listed as {x1, . . . , xm−k}. In other words, the vertices in X
3 Also note that this extended deﬁnition of Maskin monotonicity would be implied by Maskin monotonicity in terms of extended preferences according 
to (P1) or (P2) or any other sensible preference extension.
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deﬁne W by
W = {(i, xp ) ∈ X × Y : x j Rix for all j ∈ {m− k + 1, . . . ,m} with j > }.
Thus, for every vertex corresponding to an alternative x ∈ A \ {xm−k+1, . . . , xm}, we let there be an edge between this 
vertex and the vertex corresponding to a voter i if and only if x j Rix for every j = m − k + 1, . . . , m. For every vertex 
corresponding to an alternative x for some  ∈ {m − k + 1, . . . , m − 1}, we let there be an edge between this vertex and the 
vertex corresponding to a voter i if and only if x j Rix for all j =  + 1, . . . , m.
We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Let RN ∈ LN . Then (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(RN ) if and only if the associated graph (X, Y , W ) has a matching V such that 
for every xp ∈ Y there is an i ∈ X with (i, xp ) ∈ V .
Proof. First, suppose that (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(RN ). Let the sets S(x),  = 1, . . . , m − 1 be as in Lemma 4.1. Then for 
each vertex xp ∈ Y there is an ip ∈ S(x) ⊆ X such that (ip , xp ) ∈ W and such that all ip are different. Thus, the set 
{(ip , xp ) : xp ∈ Y } is a matching in (X, Y , W ) satisfying the requirement for V in the lemma.
For the converse, suppose that V is a matching in (X, Y , W ) as in the lemma. For every x = xm let S(x) = {i ∈ X :
(i, xp ) ∈ V for some 1 ≤ p ≤ β(x)}. Then it is easy to verify that these sets S(x) satisfy the conditions in Lemma 4.1. 
Hence, (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(RN). 
Note that a matching as in Lemma 4.3 must be maximal, since it contains an edge for every vertex in Y . Thus, by 
this lemma, in order to decide if (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(RN ) it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd a maximal matching of the associated 
bipartite graph (X, Y , W ): then (xm−k+1, . . . , xm) ∈ Mk(RN ) if and only if the found maximal matching uses all vertices of Y . 
The problem of ﬁnding a maximal matching is polynomial (see Hopcroft and Karp, 1973). Repeating the foregoing procedure 
m(m − 1) · · · (m − k + 1) times is still polynomial (in m and n).4
5. Concluding remarks
We conclude with a few brief discussions.
5.1. Other preference extensions
We have shown in this paper that the method for choosing k out of m, based on feasible elimination procedures, has 
the core property for two intuitive preferences extensions (Theorems 3.3 and 3.4). Unfortunately, as the following example 
shows, this result does not extend to all reasonable preference extensions.
Example 5.1. Let A = {w, x, y, z}, N = {1, . . . , 5}, β(w) = β(x) = 1, and β(y) = β(z) = 2. Consider the proﬁle RN given in the 
following table:
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
y y z z x
w w w w y
x x x x z
z z y y w
Then (w, x) ∈ M2(RN ) by the f.e.p. (z, {1, 2}; y, {3, 4}; w, {5}; x). We show that (w, x) = C(EM2 , R¯N) where, for each i ∈ N , 
R¯ i is the lexicographic preference extension obtained by ﬁrst comparing best alternatives and then second best alternatives. 
Consider the following proﬁle for the coalition {1, . . . , 4}:
Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4
y y y y
z z z z
x x x x
w w w w
4 We thank Ilan Nehama of the Center for the Study of Rationality, Jerusalem, for helpful comments on this subject.
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i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, we conclude that (w, x) /∈ C(EM2 , R¯N ).
Observe that other methods do not perform better for the ‘lexicographic best extension’ in this example, by considering 
again Example 3.6.
5.2. Neutrality
An SCC is neutral if it is covariant under permutations of the alternatives. To obtain neutrality of M or, more generally, 
Mk one needs that all weights β(x) are equal, but this is not always possible, due to the restriction on β(·). Of course, one 
can always choose the weights such that the difference between any two weights is at most one. Also, if the number of 
voters is large relative to the number of alternatives, then one practically obtains neutrality: e.g., if m = 10 and n = 1000
then one can choose nine of the weights equal to 100 and one weight equal to 101.
Alternatively, one could take the union of the sets Mkβ (R
N) over all possible weight assignments β(·). It is not clear, 
however, whether this enlarged neutral SCC still has the core property.
5.3. Further literature
Peleg and Peters (2016) provide an axiomatic characterization of the correspondence M . A characterization of Mk is not 
yet available.
Among other recent works that are concerned with choosing committees we mention Kamwa (2014) and Laslier and 
Van der Straeten (2014). The former concentrates on pairwise majority relations. The latter uses approval methods; its 
Proposition 10 for the case of single-peaked preference proﬁles coincides with what feasible elimination procedures would 
achieve in this case.
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